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This paper investigates the effects of financial development and political instability on 
economic growth in a power-ARCH framework with data for Argentina from 1896 to 2000. 
Our findings suggest that (i) informal or unanticipated political instability (e.g., guerrilla 
warfare) has a direct negative impact on growth; (ii) formal or anticipated instability (e.g., 
cabinet changes) has an indirect (through volatility) impact on growth; (iii) the effect of 
financial development is positive and, surprisingly, not via volatility; (iv) the informal instability 
effects are much larger in the short- than in the long-run; and (v) the impact of financial 
development on economic growth is negative in the short- but positive in the long-run. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Instability  and  economic  performance  are  often  inversely  related.  Financial  crises  are 
associated  with  growth  decelerations  and  contractions,  while  political  protest  tends  to 
disrupt productive activities thereby affecting economic growth negatively. Such amplified 
uncertainties, driven either by economic or political events, have deleterious consequences 
in terms of economic performance, especially in the short-run. In the long-run, however, 
financial development and political instability may instead have positive effects on growth. 
For example, the supply of credit to the private sector and transitions from autocracy to 
democracy are often considered key determinants of long-run growth across countries. The 
aim of this paper is to put forward a comprehensive characterization of these relationships. 
More specifically, this paper tries to answer the following questions. What is the relation 
between, on the one hand, financial development and political instability and, on the other, 
economic  growth  and  its  volatility?  Are  the  effects  of  these  economic  and  political 
uncertainties fundamentally different? Does the sign and intensity of such effects vary over 
time  and  do they  vary  with respect to short-  versus long-run considerations?  Is  there a 
dynamic asymmetry in the impact of financial development (that is, is it negative in the 
short- and positive in the long-run)? 
This paper tries to tackle these questions using a power-ARCH (PARCH) framework 
and annual time series data for Argentina covering the period from 1896 to 2000. There are 
three  related  lines  of  research  we  should  highlight  and  to  which  this  paper  tries  to 
contribute,  namely  the  scholarship  on  finance  and  growth,  the  economic  literature  on 
political instability, and the economic history work on the Argentine puzzle. 
In terms of the finance-growth nexus, this paper tries to contribute by offering novel 
econometric evidence based on historical data. Doing so, allow us to investigate inter alia 
whether the impact of financial development on growth occurs directly or through growth   2 
volatility.1  Levine  (2005)  argues  that  the prevailing  consensus  favors  a  positive,  lasting, 
significant and causal effect from financial development to economic growth and that such 
effects are predictably stronger from measures of financial efficiency (for instance, the share 
in GDP of credit to the private sector) than from measures of financial depth (such as M3 
over GDP). Thereby using a range of measures of financial development we throw light on 
the impacts of these different measures over a much longer period of time than normally 
considered in the current literature. In addition to whether finance affects growth directly 
or  through  growth  volatility,  another  important  issue  we  tackle  is  that  identified  by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler  (2003),  Tornell  et  al.  (2004)  and  Loayza  and  Ranciere  (2006). 
Although  the  development  of  the  financial  system  is  robustly  associated  with  economic 
growth across countries, it is also often found to be the main predictor of financial crises. 
That is, while the long-run effect of finance on growth is positive, in the short-run it is 
negative.  However,  cross-country  heterogeneity,  in  general,  and  business  cycles 
synchronization issues, in particular, may play an undesirably large role in generating this 
result. Because in this paper we use data for only one country and find supporting evidence 
for this asymmetric dynamic effect, one possible contribution of our paper is to help dispel 
such concerns about this important result.2 
As for political instability, this paper tries to contribute in three ways: by bridging 
literatures,  by  exploring  puzzles  and  by  further  clarifying  the  nature  of  the  instability 
effects. Let us explain each of these in turn. One intended contribution is to try to bridge the 
literature on the macroeconomics of instability (based on cross-sectional and short-panels) 
with that on the relationship between growth and its volatility, which is mostly time-series 
                                                        
1  Levine (2005) surveys the finance and growth literature. On finance and volatility, see Bekaert et al. (2006) 
and Prasad et al. (2004.) 
2  One important issue, which is beyond the scope of this paper, is regarding the causes of financial development, 
in particular, the legal origins versus political institutions debate (see Haber and Perotti, 2007.)   3 
based.3  The latter tends to downplay the potential dependence between the two variables by 
assuming a linear relationship, the so called Bollerslev GARCH specification.   
Secondly, we try to shed light on important puzzles such as the one regarding the 
duration  of  the  political  instability  effects.  While  the  conventional  wisdom  is  that  these 
effects are severe in the long-run, Campos and Nugent (2002)4  and Murdoch and Sandler 
(2004) argue that they are stronger in the short- than in the long-run. Another puzzle we 
address is on the sign of the growth-volatility link: while Grier and Tullock (1989) argue 
that larger  standard deviations  of  growth  rates  are  associated with  larger mean  growth 
rates, Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that output growth rates are adversely affected by 
their volatility. 
Thirdly, we explore the hypothesis that different types of political instability may 
have different effects on economic growth. We do this by further developing the distinction 
between formal and informal instability introduced in Campos and Karanasos (2008). The 
distinction is based on whether or not different forms of instability originate from within the 
political system: anti-government demonstrations and guerrilla warfare are thus informal 
political instability, while constitutional reforms and government purges are classified as 
formal instability. In addition to the obvious policy implications this taxonomy supports (in 
a literature in which policy implications are scarce), this distinction allows us to investigate 
questions  that  have  not  been  investigated  so  far,  such  as  whether  or  not  the  effect  of 
informal instability is more severe in the short-run and whether or not the main effect of 
formal instability occurs through growth volatility.5   
                                                        
3  Durlauf et al. (2005) survey the former, and Grier et al. (2004), Fountas and Karanasos (2006) and Fountas et 
al. (2007) review the latter. One paper that tries to link these literatures, and is close to ours in this sense, is 
Asteriou and Price (2001), which present time series (quarterly) data evidence for the UK since 1960. 
4  Campos and Nugent (2002) argue that the long-run negative effect of political instability on growth vanishes 
without the African countries and/or once institutions are taken into account. 
5  Among our hypotheses is that the answer to these two questions is yes. We provide further justification and 
econometric support below.   4 
Last,  but  not  least,  our  third  intended  contribution  is  to  put  forward  novel 
econometric evidence on the Argentine puzzle (della Paolera and Taylor, 2003). Since the 
Industrial  Revolution,  Argentina  is  the  only  country  that  was  developed  in  1900  and 
developing  in  2000  (see  Figure  1).  Although  a  large  literature  associates  this  decline  to 
financial  and  political  factors,  we  are  unaware  of  studies  that  build  this  argument 
quantitatively, so we think ours may be a contribution to this economic history literature.6 
Anticipating our main findings, we note the following in relation to the questions 
raised at the outset. The relationship between, on the one hand, financial development and 
political instability and economic growth, on the other, is not as straightforward as one may 
think at first. We find that it crucially depends on the type of political instability and of 
financial development, as well as short- versus long-run considerations. The short-run effect 
on economic growth of both informal instability and financial development is negative and 
direct  and  these  results  are  robust  to  accounting  for  structural  breaks,  the  latter  being 
obviously important in light of the long time span we cover in this study. Yet, while the 
long-run influence of finance is positive, that of informal instability remains negative. We 
also find that the impact of formal instability, on the other hand, is indirect and operates 
through growth volatility. These provide the basis for our assessment that these economic 
and political effects are fundamentally different. Moreover, these results seem to suggest 
that  the  “severity”  of  the  political  instability  effects  “surpasses”  that  of  financial 
development.  After  all,  while  the  short-  and  long-run  finance  effects  work  in  opposite 
directions,  the  effects  of  political  instability  are  both  negative  and,  equally  importantly, 
operate through different channels. We believe the importance of these findings is also in 
                                                        
6  Campos et al. (2008) present econometric evidence supporting the view that political instability and financial 
development are more important factors to understand Argentinean growth over the last 100 years or so than 
the other factors highlighted in this literature (such as international financial market conditions, public deficits, 
and inflation.)   5 
terms of the policy lessons they generate. The vast existing literature has said little in this 
respect  as  it focused  on  informal  instability which  is,  by construction,  not  influenced  by 
government policy. In this paper, we show that formal political instability is detrimental to 
growth via the volatility channel and, together with informal instability, may have played a 
truly substantial role in the demise of the Argentinean economy since the 1890s. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the historical context for the paper 
by showing how political instability and financial development contributed to the decline of 
Argentina  from  a  position  of  a  rich  or  developed  country  in  year  1900  to  that  of  a 
middle-income or developing country in year 2000. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 
details our econometric methodology. Section 5 contains our baseline econometric results as 
well as our two main sensitivity tests: on short- and long-run considerations and structural 
breaks. Section 6 concludes and suggests directions for future research. 
 
2.    FINANCE AND INSTABILITY IN ARGENTINA 
Among economic historians, there is little disagreement that the period from 1875 to the eve 
of  World  War  I  is  the  Belle  Époque  of  recent  Argentinean  history  (Taylor,  1992; 
Sanz-Villarroya,  2007).  There  is  also  little  disagreement  among  scholars  that  the 
Argentina's uniqueness is because no other country climbed down so dramatically from the 
selected group of developed countries. The major disagreement among economic historians 
to this day is not whether but actually when the unchecked decline started. Some argue that 
it  started  with  the  1930  crisis  (e.g.,  Diaz-Alejandro  1985),  others  argue  for  an  earlier 
turning point (Taylor argues for 1913), while Sanz-Villarroya (2005) calculates that the first 
important structural break for Argentina happens in 1899.7 
                                                        
7  Below we present and discuss our Bai-Perron estimates of the date of structural breaks in Argentinean growth. 
We find (and adjust our estimates accordingly below) evidence for two structural breaks: 1922 and 1964.           6 
Irrespective of exactly when the decline started, it is also clear that its existence was 
not undisputed until the immediate post II World War. In 1947 Argentina was still ranked 
10th country in the world in terms of per capita income (Alston and Gallo, 2007, p. 6). della 
Paolera and Taylor (2003) note that “by 1900 Argentina's income per capita had risen from 
about 67 per cent of developed country-levels in 1870, to 90 percent in 1900, and 100 per 
cent in 1913. Whatever its exact status in 1913, for all practical purposes Argentina was an 
advanced country” (2003, p. 5). They also calculate that since then the ratio of Argentina's 
income to OECD income fell to 84 percent in 1950, and then to 43 percent in 1987. This 
ratio  rebounds  in  the  1990s  but  again  reverts  with  the  2001  crisis.8  It  must  not  go 
unnoticed that in a recent book on the Great Depressions of the XXth Century (Kehoe and 
Prescott, 2007), Argentina is the only country that has two chapters (out of 16) entirely and 
solely dedicated to its economy. 
It  is  not  surprisingly,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  vast  literature  on  the  Argentine 
puzzle,  providing  alternative  explanations  for  the  long-run  relative  decline  of  the 
Argentinean  economy.  Finance  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  too  in  terms  of 
potential  role  in  explaining  the  decline  (della  Paolera  and  Taylor,  1998).  Fort  instance, 
Prados de la Escosura and Sanz-Villarroya (2006) argue that contract intensive money is 
the  key  in  explaining  the  Argentine  puzzle.  Taylor  (2003)  associates  the  decline  to  low 
savings rates (the high dependency rate linked to the immigration policy). This may also 
combine well with Solberg view to highlight the issue of (restricted) access to finance as a 
way of perpetuating the high inequality levels. 
Although  a  large  literature  associates  the  long-run  relative  decline  of  the 
                                                        
8  Growth was negative from 1999 onwards culminating with around -10% in year 2002. The 2001 crisis entailed 
a  default  on  large  part  of  the  external  debt,  devaluation,  inflation,  and  the  freezing  of  bank  accounts  (the 
corralito.) Riots, looting and anti-government demonstrations followed. See Kehoe (2003) for a discussion.   7 
Argentinean  economy  with  political  factors, 9  we  are  unaware  of  studies  that  try  to 
quantitatively  evaluate  this  association.  For  instance,  Acemoglu  and  Robinson  (2006) 
observe  that: “The political  history  of  Argentina  reveals  an  extraordinary  pattern  where 
democracy was created in 1912, undermined in 1930, re-created in 1946, undermined in 
1955, fully re-created in 1973, undermined in 1976, and finally reestablished in 1983” (2006, 
p. 7). In a recent paper, Alston and Gallo (2007) identify the onset of widespread electoral 
fraud in the 1930s as a turning point for the erosion of the rule of law and one main reason 
for the Argentinean decline.   
In  what  follows,  we  take  these  considerations  on  board  in  trying  to  provide  a 
comprehensive quantitative account of the relative importance of two of the main reasons 
often  identified  with  the  Argentinean  debacle,  namely  political  instability  and  financial 
development.     
 
3. DATA 
The  data  set  we  put  together  for  this  paper  comprises  various  measures  of  political 
instability, financial development and economic growth. Our main data source is the Cross 
National Time Series Data set (Banks 2005) which contains historical series on income per 
capita and various dimensions of instability.10  This is a commercial database that has been 
extensively used in the scholarship on growth and political instability (Durlauf et al., 2005.) 
Data are available yearly for Argentina from 1896 until 2000, for various instability series, 
excluding the two World War years (that is, 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 1945). 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of our results we use a taxonomy of political 
                                                        
9 See also della Paolera and Taylor (2003) and references therein. 
10  We have obtained GDP growth and level figures from various other sources (as well as industrial output 
series) in order to assess the sensitivity of the results in this regard and the initial results (not reported) show 
that different measures of the rate of economic growth do not affect our results below.   8 
instabilities based on the distinction between formal and informal (that is, whether or not it 
originates from within the political system).11  Our informal political instability variables 
are as follows: anti-government demonstrations (peaceful public gatherings of at least 100 
people), assassinations (defined as politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a 
high  government  official  or  politician),  guerrilla  warfare  (armed  activity,  sabotage,  or 
bombings  by  independent  bands  of  citizens  and  aimed  at  regime  overthrow),  strikes  (a 
general strike of 1,000 or more workers involving more multiple employers and aimed at 
government policies), and revolutions (illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, 
attempts at, or successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion). These series are available since 
1919.    Our informal political instability variables are as follows:    the number of cabinet 
changes, the size of the cabinet, the number of constitutional changes, government crises, 
the number of legislative elections, and purges (which measure any systematic elimination 
by  jailing  or  execution  of  political  opposition  within  the  ranks  of  the  regime  or  the 
opposition.)12     
We use various measures of financial development. One is the ratio of M3 to GDP, 
from Alston and Gallo (2007). The main reason for considering this measure is that it has 
been  used  extensively  in  the  finance-growth  literature  (King  and  Levine,  1993;  Levine, 
2005). One well-known drawback of this measure, however, is that the ratio of M3 to GDP 
reflects financial depth or the relative size of the financial system. It does not necessarily 
reflect how efficient the financial system actually is. We also use a narrower version of this 
variable (M1 over GDP) to check for the robustness of our results (source of the data for this 
measure  is  Bordo et  al.,  2001). Our other two  measures  of financial  development try  to 
                                                        
11  Our political instability variables enter one by one in the econometric framework we use, so our results are 
not affected by the taxonomy and as such it is used simply to facilitate the interpretation.       
12  In our view, among all informal instability variables, “purges” is the closest to what we call formal instability, 
while “revolutions” is the one we think is closer to our formal instability variables (among informal instability.)       9 
capture the efficiency of the financial sector, not its relative size. The source for both is 
Mitchell  (2003).  The  first  is  the  bank  deposits  by  the  private  sector  over  GDP  (private 
deposits), which we believe is a good proxy for the share of credit to the private sector over 
GDP. Our second measure from Mitchell (2003) is the total deposits in savings banks over 
GDP. Given its more restrictive nature and the fact that the exact definition of savings bank 
contains a fluid legal element, we use this measure mostly for robustness check thereby 
attaching greater weight to private deposits.13 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly gained 
currency in the finance literature.14  Let growth (yt) follow a white noise process augmented 
by (i) a risk premium defined in terms of volatility (ht ), and (ii) either a political instability 
or a financial development variable (xit): 
 





t t t h e = ε  
 
where  {et}  are  independently  and  identically  distributed  (i.i.d)  random  variables  with 
E(et)=E(et2 -1)=0, while ht is positive with probability one and is a measurable function of the 
sigma-algebra  ∑ −1 t , which is generated by  }. , , { 2 1 K − − t t y y    
In  other  words, ht  denotes the  conditional  variance  of  growth.  In  particular, ht  is 
specified  as  an  asymmetric  PARCH(1,1)  process  with  lagged  growth  included  in  the 
                                                        
13  Because the original financial development variables are I(1), we use them all in first differences. 
14   See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer (2005, 2008) use this process to model 
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where δ (with 0 > δ )  is  the  heteroscedasticity  parameter,  α and β are  the  ARCH  and 
GARCH  coefficients  respectively,  ς   with  1 < ς   is  the  leverage  term  and l γ is  the  level 
term for the lth lag of growth.15  In order to distinguish the general PARCH model from a 
version  in which  δ   is  fixed  (but  not  necessarily  equal  to  two) we refer  to  the latter  as 
(P)ARCH.  
The PARCH model increases the flexibility of the conditional variance specification 
by allowing the data to determine the power of growth for which the predictable structure in 
the volatility pattern is the strongest. This feature in the volatility process has important 
implications for the relationship between political instability, finance, and growth and its 
volatility. There is no strong reason for assuming that the conditional variance is a linear 
function of lagged squared errors. The common use of a squared term in this role is most 
likely to be a reflection of the normality assumption traditionally invoked. However, if we 
accept that growth data are very likely to have a non-normal error distribution, then the 
superiority of a squared term is unwarranted and other power transformations may be more 
appropriate. 
The PARCH model may also be viewed as a standard GARCH model for observations 
that have been changed by a sign-preserving power transformation implied by a (modified) 
PARCH  parameterization.  He  and  Teräsvirta  (1999)  emphasize  that  if  the  standard 
                                                        
 
15 The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and the 
asymmetric absolute residuals.   11 
Bollerslev type of model is augmented by the heteroscedasticity parameter (the power term), 
the estimates of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients almost certainly change.16   
Moreover, by squaring the growth rates one effectively imposes a structure on the 
data  which  may  potentially  yield  sub-optimal  modeling  and  forecasting  performance 
relative  to  other  power  terms.  One  way  to  assess  the  severity  of  this  assumption  is  to 
investigate the temporal properties of the power transformed absolute growth 
d
t y . First, 
we examine the sample autocorrelations of the power transformed absolute growth  |yt|
d   for 
various positive values of d. Figure 4 shows the autocorrelogram of 
d
t y | | from lag 1 to 20 
for a range of d values. The horizontal lines show the T / 96 . 1 ± confidence interval (CI) for 
the estimated sample autocorrelations if the process  t y is i.i.d. In this particular case, CI 
± = ± = T / 96 . 1 0.2032. 
The sample autocorrelations for 
8 . 0
t y are greater than the sample autocorrelations 
of  |yt|d for d= 0.9, 1, 1.5, 2 and 2.5 at every lag. Or to put it differently, the most important 
conclusion  from  the  autocorrelogram  is  that  |yt|d has  the  largest  autocorrelation  when 
8 . 0 = d . Furthermore, the power transformations of absolute growth when d is 0.8 have 
significant positive autocorrelations at least up to lag 10. Moreover, note that at all lags, 
|yt|d has  the  lowest  autocorrelation  when  2 = d .  This  result  appears  to  argue  against 
Bollerslev specification. 
Above all, the statistical significance of the in-mean effect is highly dependent on the 
choice  of  the  value  of  the  heteroscedasticity  parameter.  The  effect  might  become 
insignificant if the power term surpasses a specific value. This suggests that if one assumes 
                                                        
16  Karanasos and Schurer (2008) find that the relationship between the variable and its conditional variance is 
sensitive to changes in the values of the heteroscedasticity parameter. Put differently, the estimated values of   12 
a priori a linear relationship between a variable and its uncertainty, the so-called Bollerslev 
specification,  a  significant  link  between  the  two  might  not  be  detected.  Interestingly, 
Karanasos  and  Schurer  (2008)  find  that  for  inflation  this  value  coincides  with  the  one 
chosen by the information criteria and the one for which the sample autocorrelation of the 
power-transformed series is maximal.     
 
5. RESULTS 
We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1) model in equations (1) and (2) in order to 
take into account the serial correlation observed in the levels and power transformations of 
our time series data. The Tables below report the estimated parameters of interest for the 
period 1896-2000. These were obtained by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as 
implemented in EVIEWS. The best fitting specification is chosen according to the Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) results and the minimum value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). 
Once heteroscedasticity in the conditional mean has been accounted for, our specifications 
appear to capture the serial correlation in the growth series.17 
In order to study the direct effects of political instability and financial development 
we  specify  model  1  with 0 = = l γ φ in  equation  2,  while  model  2  with 0 = λ in  equation  1 
allows us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth.18  In all cases the estimates for the 
in-mean parameter (k) are statistically significant and positive. The estimated ARCH and 
GARCH parameters (α andβ ) are highly significant in all cases but one. 
For model 1 ( 0 = = l γ φ ), when the informal political stability variables are used, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the in-mean and the level effects are fragile to changes in the power term. 
17  For all cases, we find that the leverage term is insignificant, so we re-estimate excluding this parameter. 
18  With a limited number of observations the non-linear structure should not be overextended as this imposes 
excessive requirements on the data. Therefore we estimate the direct (model 1) and the indirect (model 2) effects 
separately.   13 
estimated  power  term  coefficientδ ranges  from  0.8  (revolutions)  to  1.0  (anti-government 
demonstrations). 19  The  corresponding  value  for  all  but  one  specification  with  formal 
instability  variables  is  0.8  (last  column  of  Table  1).  For  model  2  (with  0 = λ ),  with  the 
informal instability variables Akaike IC (AIC) selects (P)ARCH models withδ equal to 0.9 
(anti-government  demos,  guerrilla  warfare  and  strikes)  or  to  0.8  (assassinations  and 
revolutions).20  For three out of the six formal variables the estimated value of  δ   is 1 (last 
column  of  Table  2).  Finally,  for  both  models  1  and  2,  when  the  financial  development 
variables  are  used,  in  all  but  one  cases  the  IC  chooses  a  (P)ARCH  specification  with 
estimated power term 0.8.   
From  the  results  for  Model  1  reported  in  Table  1,  the  parameters  λ for 
assassinations,  guerrilla  warfare  and  strikes  (three  measures  of  informal  political 
instability)  reveal  their  direct,  negative  and  statistically  significant  impact  on  economic 
growth. Note that none of the corresponding effects for the formal instability variables are 
statistically significant (Panel B). Importantly, we find the impact of financial development 
on economic growth to be positive and statistically significant, irrespective of the variable 
we use to proxy for it (the least significant coefficient being that on M3/GDP.) 
The results in Table 1 are particularly interesting mainly for two reasons. One is 
that they provide evidence strongly suggesting that the type of political instability matters 
vis-à-vis economic growth: informal instability has a direct and negative effect, while formal 
instability clearly does not. Second, they show that financial development has a positive and 
direct effect on growth, with M3 over GDP (a measure of the size of the financial sector, not 
of its efficiency) arguably being the weakest effect.   
                                                        
19  With a limited number of time-series observations it is not feasible to estimate with sufficient accuracy the 
power term. 
20  In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in Table 2, various lags of growth (from 1 to 12) were 
considered with the best model (l = 6) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC.   14 
Examining the results for Model 2 (reported in Table 2) and focusing our attention on 
the  φ   and  kparameters,21  we can now see that the formal political instability variables 
have strong indirect (through volatility) negative effects on growth. This result obtains for 
cabinet changes and size, and constitutional changes. That is, these three variables affect 
volatility  negatively  ) 0 ( < φ   and,  since 0 > k ,  they  affect  growth  negatively  as  well. 
Interestingly, none of the financial development and informal instability measures reveals 
such indirect effects (instead, as discussed above, they exhibit a direct impact on growth). 
These  results  reinforce  the  notion  that  the  type  of  political  instability  matters  vis-à-vis 
economic growth: while informal may have a direct impact, the effect of formal political 
instability operates indirectly, via growth volatility. 
 
5.1. SHORT- AND LONG-RUN ISSUES 
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our 
baseline  results.  In  order  to  estimate  short-  and  long-  run  relationships  we  employ  the 
following error correction (P)ARCH form 
, ) ( 1 , 1 , t t i t l t i l t u x c y x y + − − + ∆ = ∆ − − − λ ϕ θ         (3) 
where  l θ   andλ captures the short and long-run effects respectively, andϕ is the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run relationship.22  This is accomplished by embedding a long-run 
growth regression into an ARDL model.23  In other words, the term in parenthesis contains 
the long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition 
                                                        
21  Note that, for all cases in model 2, there is evidence of a positive bidirectional feedback between growth and 
its volatility. The existing empirical literature focuses mainly on the effect of volatility on growth, see Fountas et 
al. (2006) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007). 
22  As pointed out by Loayaza and Rancière (2006) the requirements for the validity of this methodology are that: 
i) there exists a long-run relationship between the variables of interest and, ii) the dynamic specification of the 
model  is  sufficiently  augmented  so  that  the  regressors  are  strictly  exogenous  and  the  resulting  residual  is 
serially uncorrelated. 
23  For details on the “ARDL approach,” see Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Shin (1999).   15 
 
, t it t x c y ε λ + + =           (4) 
 
where t ε is ) 0 ( I .24  The lag of the first/second difference of the political instability/financial 
development  variable  ( l t i x − ∆ , )  characterizes  the  short-run  effect.  The  condition  for  the 
existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the coefficient on the 
error-correction term be negative and not lower than -2 (that is,  0 2 < < − ϕ ). We also take 
into account the power ARCH effects by specifying the error term  ut  as follows 
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2
1
t t t h e u =                                                             (5) 
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Table  3  presents  the  results  on  the  estimation  of  short  and  long-run  parameters 
linking  informal  instability  or  financial  development  with  growth.  In  all  cases,  the 
estimated coefficient on the error correction term (ϕ ) lies within the dynamically stable 
range ) 0 , 2 (− .  More  precisely,  the  estimates  of  ϕ   for  informal  instability  and  financial 
development lie within the range  71 . 0 −   to  50 . 0 − and  85 . 0 −   to  44 . 0 − , respectively. 
Regarding the short and long-run effect estimates,  l θ   and  λ , we focus our analysis 
first on those obtained from the informal instability variables. In all cases the estimates of 
the short-run coefficients are highly significant and negative and their absolute values are 
higher  than  the  corresponding  values  for  the  long-run  coefficients  (for  anti-government 
                                                        
24  t ε follows a (P)ARCH process given by equations (2)-(3) with    0 = = = ς φ γ l .   16 
demonstrations, the long-run effect is not significantly different from zero). This provides 
supporting evidence for the notion that the duration of the political instability effect does 
indeed matter and, for informal instability, such effects tend to be considerably stronger in 
the  short-  than  in  the  long-run  as  previously  noted  by  Campos  and  Nugent  (2002)  and 
Murdoch and Sandler (2004). The unexpected result is for revolutions: we found that the 
long-run effect on growth is positive. One possible explanation is that of escalation: political 
instability comes in cycles in which the level of political violence accelerates, with maxima 
coinciding with revolutions. Because revolutions reflect illegal or forced change in the top 
government elite (as well as successful or unsuccessful armed rebellions), their occurrence 
may be the culmination of a cycle of political violence, thus marking the beginning of a 
period of relatively low levels of political instability (and higher or more stable growth rates.) 
Another piece of evidence we can offer in support of this conjecture is that the revolutions 
series peaks around the date of the second structural break we identify in the GDP growth 
series (we noted above, and will discuss this issue in full in the next section below, that we 
find two breaks in the growth series, the first in year 1922 and the second in year 1964.)   
Next we discuss the results regarding the financial development variables. In the 
long-run, we find that financial development affects growth positively. This result is very 
much  in  line  with  the  large  empirical  literature  reviewed  by  Levine  (2005)  and  it  is 
interesting  we  can  reproduce  it  with  our  rather  different  methodology.  Maybe  more 
interestingly,  the  short-run  coefficients  tell  a  very  differently  story:  we  find  that  the 
short-run impact of financial development on growth is negative and significant. Thus our 
results square well with recent findings by Loayaza and Rancière (2006), among others, in 
that  the  sign  of  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  financial  development 
depends on whether the movements are temporary or permanent (the effect being negative 
in the former and positive in the latter.) Finally, it is noteworthy that our results are robust   17 
to various measures of financial development and also that the stronger long-run effects we 
obtain are for our measures of financial efficiency rather than for our measures of the size of 
the financial sector (according to Levine, 2005, this is also in line with the recent evidence).   
 
5.2. STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
In this section we subject our baseline results to an important robustness test. That is, we 
asses whether taking structural breaks into account affects our main results. We find that, 
overall, it does not.   
We use the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether 
there  are  any  structural  breaks  in  growth,  its  volatility,  the  various  political  instability 
series and the first differences of the four financial development variables. Bai and Perron 
(2003) address the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under very general 
conditions on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, 
these statistics identify the number and location of multiple breaks. 25 
In  the  case  of  the  economic  growth  series  (and,  interestingly,  also  for  growth 
volatility)  the  Bai-Perron  methodology  supports  two  structural  break  points.26 The  first 
occurs for year 1922 and the second for year 1964.  For our political instability variables, 
we  find  no  structural  breaks  for  the  assassinations,  guerilla  warfare,  cabinet  and 
constitutional  changes  series, 27  and  we  also  find  no  breaks  in  the  four  financial 
development variables.  
However, our Bai-Perron results support that general strikes and government crises 
have one common structural break, which is dated for year 1955. This is a result of great 
                                                        
 
25  Details are available from the authors upon request.   
26  As a measure of volatility, we use the power transformed absolute growth.   
27  Our data shows no guerilla warfare before 1948 and after 1977.     18 
importance: 1955 is the year of the military coup in which President Juan Domingo Perón 
was overthrown by the military thus concluding a defining chapter in Argentine history. 
Breaks in the revolutions and purges series are detected for about the same political period, 
more specifically for year 1951.28 Further, we also find one structural break in cabinet size 
and  legislative  elections  (they  are  dated  1946  and  1949,  respectively)  while  in 
anti-government demonstrations we find two breaks dated 1954 and 1972.29   
In  what  follows,  we  incorporate  dummy  variables  in  the  equations  (1),  (2),  thus 
taking  into  account  breaks  in  the  political  instability  variables  and  in  the  volatility  of 
growth. First, we introduce the following notation.  t D1 , t D2  are (intercept) dummies defined 
as  D1t,  D2t  =  1  in  the  periods  1922-2000  and  1964-2000,  respectively,  and  D1t,  D2t  =  0 
otherwise. Similarly,  it D  is a (slope) dummy indicating the period which starts from the 
year  of  the  break  in  the  political  instability  variable  ( it x ).  For  example  for  strikes  and 
government crises  it D  = 1 in the period from 1955 to 2000 whereas for cabinet size  it D  = 1 
during the period from 1946 until the end of the sample. 
The augmented model is given by 
, 1 t it it it t t x D x kh c y ε λ λ + + + + =  
and                            (6)   




1 2 2 1 1
2
it it it l t l t t t t t t x D x y h e f h D D h φ φ γ β α ω ω ω
δ δ δ
+ + + + + + + = − − − −  
 
                                                        
28  In purges there is a second break dated 1978 but since after that year there were no purges we do not need to 
use a dummy variable.   
29  With arguably one exception (anti-government demonstrations in 1972, which were motivated by demands for 
the return of Perón from exile), all the structural breaks in our political instability series occur during Perón 
governments. Perón was elected president three times. His first term is from 1946 to 1952. He is re-elected in 
1951, his second term starts in 1952 and ends abruptly in 1955. His third term is between 1973 (allowed to 
return from Spain after 18-year exile) and 1974 (suffers fatal heart attack.) Although marked by severe economic 
problems, the second term (1951 to 1955) is more often remembered by the political instability (the various 
terrorist attacks being a sad prelude to the so-called “Dirty War” of 1970s.)   19 
Recall  that  the  coefficients  λ  and  ϕ  capture  the  impacts  of  the  political  instability 
variable on growth and its volatility respectively. Similarly,  1 λ  and  1 ϕ   correspond to the 
two effects from the year of the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by  λ  
andϕ in the period up to the year of the structural break, and by  λ  +  1 λ   and  ϕ  +  1 ϕ   
during the period from the year of the break until the end of the sample. As in section 4 in 
order to study the direct effects of political instability and financial development we specify 
model 1 with  ϕ  =  1 ϕ  = 0, while model 2 with  λ   =  1 λ  = 0 allows us to investigate their 
indirect impacts on growth. 
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the conditional variance 
equation (5), as follows 
 





1 1 2 2 1 1
2 .        (7) 
 
Overall, we find our results to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break 
dummies (see Tables 4-6).30 That is, (i) informal instability have a direct negative effect on 
growth,  while  formal  instability  have  an  indirect (through  volatility)  negative  impact  on 
growth, (ii) financial development affects growth positively in the long-run but negatively in 
the short-run, (iii) the effects of the informal instability are significantly stronger in the 
short- than in the long-run. 
It is also noteworthy that before 1951, growth is independent of changes in purges, 
whereas  after  1951  a  negative,  causal  relationship  began  to  exist  (meaning  that  purges 
behaves  similarly  to  our  informal  instability  variables).  In  addition,  the  impact  of 
                                                        
30  The results (not reported) are also robust to the inclusion of intercept dummies in the mean equation for 
growth as well.   20 
revolutions on growth becomes negative after 1951. Note also that the causal negative effect 
of  strikes  reflects  the  period  1955-2000  (see  Panels  A  and  B  of  Table  4),  which  is  not 
surprising given the intricate relationship between the governments of Peron and organized 
labor. Interestingly, the negative causal effects from legislative elections and government 
crises to growth volatility, become stronger after 1949 and 1955 respectively (see Panel B of 
Table  5.)  Finally,  note  that  when  we  take  into  account  breaks  and  level  effects  in  the 
volatility of growth, the long-run effects of anti-government demonstrations, assassinations 
and revolutions disappear (see Panel A of Table 6) thereby reinforcing our finding that the 
effects of informal political instability are more severe in the short- than in the long-run. 
Moreover, the coefficient of M3 over GDP also becomes insignificant, while the same does 
not happen to the measures that go beyond the size of the financial sector.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS     
In a power-ARCH framework using data for Argentina from approximately 1890 to 2000 
this  paper  found  that:  (a)  informal  political  instability  (assassinations,  guerilla  warfare, 
strikes, etc.) have a direct negative effect on economic growth, while formal instability (e.g., 
cabinet changes and size, and constitutional changes) have an indirect impact on growth 
(through its volatility); (b) financial development affects economic growth positively; (c) the 
informal instability effects are substantially larger in the short- than in the long-run; and (d) 
the financial development effects are negative in the short- but positive in the long-run. 
These findings are interesting in themselves but they also matter because they raise 
a number of new questions that we believe may be useful in motivating future research. 
Here  we  highlight  two  related  suggestions:  one  on  the  role  of  finance  and  one  on 
methodology.  Regarding  the  role  of  finance  in  the  process  of  economic  development,  our 
finding reinforces a large body of previous research in that we also show a strong, positive   21 
impact of financial development on growth in the long-run. However, the negative effects of 
political  instability  on  growth  might  outweigh  the  positive  influence  of  financial 
development.  We  find  that  different  forms  of  political  instability  affect  growth  through 
different channels over different time windows, making up for a strong and rather resilient 
effect that seem really too powerful vis-à-vis the benefits brought to the table by financial 
development. We can not forget however that Argentina is unique: no other country in the 
world since the Industrial Revolution went from riches to rags. Put it differently, Argentina 
is  an  outlier  and  further  research  should  replicate  our  analysis  using  the  historical 
experience of other countries (ideally in a panel setting). That is, to study the relationship 
between  political  instability,  financial  development  and  economic  growth  in  a  panel  of 
developing countries  would strengthen what we know.  However,  it has  to  be taken  into 
account that the data requirements are very heavy indeed, with most developing countries 
lacking  historical  data  even  on  key  figures,  such  as  per  capita  GDP,  going  back  to  the 
beginning  or  middle  of  the  XIXth  century.  This,  of course,  does  not  make  this  task  less 
important. The second suggestion refers to a possible methodological improvement, namely 
the application of the bivariate PARCH model to the problem at hand (albeit the relatively 
small  number  of  observations).  The  joint  estimation  of  the  political  instability-financial 
development-growth system in a panel of countries would clearly represent progress and is 
something we feel future research should try to address.   
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Ratio of Argentina to US-CAN-NZ-AUS Ratio of Argentina to Western Europe
 
 
Note: Authors' calculations using GDP per capita data from Maddison (2007), Western Europe is Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. The 
other group, Western Offshoots, includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and United States.   
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Figure 2. Measures of Financial Development   27 
Figure 3. Measures of Informal Political Instability
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Figure 4. Measures of Formal Political Instability 
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Figure 5.    Autocorrelation of 
d
PCI G_ from high to low 
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